Three Essays in Crime and Economics

Zachary Cady

Advisor: Alex T Tabarrok, PhD, Department of Economics

Committee Members: Tyler Cowen, Thomas Stratmann

Buchanan Hall, #D180
April 20, 2026, 02:30 PM to 04:00 PM

Abstract:

My dissertation is a compilation of three unique chapters, each dealing with a separate question at the intersection of crime and economics.

The first chapter examines the relationship between revenue shortfalls to law enforcement agencies and those agencies’ use of asset forfeiture. The underlying idea is that agencies facing such shortfalls will increase their utilization of the asset forfeiture process as a means of generating additional revenue to make-up at least some portion of the shortfall. Much of the research into this question has looked at economic indicators and compared those indicators to forfeiture levels. I wanted to take a different approach by finding a natural experiment that could be used to see what would happen to asset forfeiture behavior following a large, sudden, and unexpected drop in law enforcement revenues. I settled on looking at law enforcement agencies in Louisiana during the oil glut of the mid-2010s, during which time plummeting oil prices wreaked havoc on the heavily oil-producing economy of the Pelican State. This resulted in lower tax revenues and, ultimately, budget cuts for law enforcement agencies. Utilizing a synthetic control framework, I compare the patterns of asset forfeiture behavior by Louisiana law enforcement agencies to the patterns of law enforcement agencies in other states during the same period of time.

The second chapter examines the relationship between hunting culture and burglary behavior. Having grown-up in the mountains of western North Carolina, I once found myself thinking that potential burglars in that area would probably be far more cautious about burglarizing homes (and perhaps even other establishments), as a result of there being a high number of armed hunters per capita in the area relative to other areas. Given this, I decided to explore whether or not areas with more hunters per capita experience lower levels of burglary, particularly residential burglary, relative to areas with fewer hunters per capita. To answer this, I build a national panel dataset that draws on crime data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports and regress that data on hunting permit data gathered by United States Fish and Wildlife Service. I consider a number of alternative specifications and consider what the results might indicate for applications of rational choice theory to crime, including the debate about whether guns serve as more of an inducement or a deterrent to burglars.

The third chapter examines the relationship between the legality of prostitution and patterns of human trafficking. There is often an assumption in policy circles that reducing prohibitions on prostitution will result in increased human trafficking, as eager suppliers seek to capitalize on increased demand by increasing flows of trafficked prostitutes to areas with now-laxer restrictions. However, an alternative theory posits that as restrictions on prostitution are relaxed, trafficking will become less prevalent, as suppliers will no longer have to operate on the black market to obtain prostitutes at a higher cost and will seek to establish brands known for not utilizing trafficked individuals. This chapter explores the underlying economic questions involved in analyzing this issue, particularly the data issues involved.