The Political Economy of Rules with Applications to Private and Public Aid Programs

Brigitta Jones

Advisor: Christopher Coyne, PhD, Department of Economics

Committee Members: Pete Boettke, Rosolino Candela

Online Location, https://gmu.zoom.us/j/99975000671
April 10, 2026, 10:00 AM to 12:00 PM

Abstract:

In the first chapter of James Buchanan’s The Reason of Rules he writes, “If rules influence outcomes and if some outcomes are ‘better’ than others, it follows that to the extent that rules can be chosen, the study and analysis of comparative rules and institutions become proper objects of our attention” (1985 [2000], 4). Following this, many scholars have highlighted the importance of looking at how rules affect outcomes and in particular how rules can be designed to achieve desired outcomes. Buchanan saw that the explanations of many social phenomena come from the differences in the rules that people respond to, as opposed to coming from differences in the people themselves. Economist Peter Boettke explains, “As Buchanan often stressed, same players, different rules, produce different games. The explanatory thrust in this approach is to be found not in the behavioral attributes we assign to individual actors, but in the alternative institutional frameworks within which they operate” (2018; italics in original).  My dissertation builds upon the work of Buchanan, analyzing the effects of rules on altering decision making.

My dissertation consists of three chapters that examine the how rules can be designed to bring about ‘better’ or more preferred outcomes. The first chapter looks at how the constitutional rules that inform government decisions can be designed to maximize individual freedom. The use of the generality principle ensures policy decisions are made in such a way that limits the coercion of the state. The second and third chapters analyze how rules can be used in the provision of aid to care for the least well off in a way that is sustainable in the long run. These chapters show how rules are necessary to avoid collective action problems such as the Samaritan’s dilemma.